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Abstract
We propose a formal framework for interpretable machine learning. Combining ele-
ments from statistical learning, causal interventionism, and decision theory, we design
an idealised explanation game in which players collaborate to find the best explana-
tion(s) for a given algorithmic prediction. Through an iterative procedure of questions
and answers, the players establish a three-dimensional Pareto frontier that describes
the optimal trade-offs between explanatory accuracy, simplicity, and relevance. Multi-
ple rounds are played at different levels of abstraction, allowing the players to explore
overlapping causal patterns of variable granularity and scope. We characterise the
conditions under which such a game is almost surely guaranteed to converge on a
(conditionally) optimal explanation surface in polynomial time, and highlight obsta-
cles that will tend to prevent the players from advancing beyond certain explanatory
thresholds. The game serves a descriptive and a normative function, establishing a con-
ceptual space in which to analyse and compare existing proposals, as well as design
new and improved solutions.
Keywords Algorithmic explainability · Explanation game · Interpretable machine
learning · Pareto frontier · Relevance
1 Introduction
Machine learning (ML) algorithms have made enormous progress on a wide range
of tasks in just the last few years. Some notable recent examples include mastering
perfect information games like chess and Go (Silver et al. 2018), diagnosing skin cancer
(Esteva et al. 2017), and proposing new organic molecules (Segler et al. 2018). These
technical achievements have coincided with the increasing ubiquity of ML, which
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is now widely used across the public and private sectors for everything from film
recommendations (Bell and Koren 2007) and sports analytics (Bunker and Thabtah
2019) to genomics (Zou et al. 2019) and predictive policing (Perry et al. 2013). ML
algorithms are expected to continue improving as hardware becomes increasingly
efficient and datasets grow ever larger, providing engineers with all the ingredients
they need to create more sophisticated models for signal detection and processing.
Recent advances in ML have raised a number of pressing questions regarding the
epistemic status of algorithmic outputs. One of the most hotly debated topics in this
emerging discourse is the role of explainability. Because many of the top performing
models, such as deep neural networks, are essentially black boxes—dazzlingly com-
plex systems optimised for predictive accuracy, not user intelligibility—some fear
that this technology may be inappropriate for sensitive, high-stakes applications. The
call for more explainable algorithms has been especially urgent in areas like clinical
medicine (Watson et al. 2019) and military operations (Gunning 2017), where user
trust is essential and errors could be catastrophic. This has led to a number of interna-
tional policy frameworks that recommend explainability as a requirement for any ML
system (Floridi and Cowls 2019).
Explainability is fast becoming a top priority in statistical research, where it is
often abbreviated as explainable Artificial Intelligence (xAI) or interpretable Machine
Learning (iML). We adopt the latter initialism here to emphasise our focus on super-
vised learning algorithms (formally defined in Sect. 3.1) as opposed to other, more
generic artificial intelligence applications.
Several commentators have argued that the central aim of iML is underspecified
(Doshi-Velez and Kim 2017; Lipton 2018). They raise concerns about the irreducible
subjectivity of explanatory success, a concept that they argue is poorly defined and
difficult or impossible to measure. In this article, we tackle this problem head on.
We provide a formal framework for conceptualising the goals and constraints of iML
systems by designing an idealised explanation game. Our model clarifies the trade-offs
inherent in any iML solution, and characterises the conditions under which epistemic
agents are almost surely guaranteed to converge on an optimal set of explanations in
polynomial time. The game serves a descriptive and a normative function, establishing
a conceptual space in which to analyse and compare existing proposals, as well as
design new and improved solutions.
The remainder of this paper is structured as follows. In Sect. 2, we identify three
distinct goals of iML. In Sect. 3, we review relevant background material. We clarify
the scope of our proposal in Sect. 4. In Sect. 5, we articulate the rules of the explanation
game and outline the procedure in pseudocode. A discussion follows in Sect. 6. We
consider five objections in Sect. 7, before concluding in Sect. 8.
2 Why explain algorithms?
We highlight three goals that guide those working in iML: to audit, to validate, and
to discover. These objectives help motivate and focus the discussion, providing an
intuitive typology for the sorts of explanations we are likely to seek and value in this
context. Counterarguments to the project of iML are delayed until Sect. 7.
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2.1 Justice as (algorithmic) fairness
Perhaps the most popular reason to explain algorithms is their large and growing social
impact. ML has been used to help evaluate loan applications (Munkhdalai et al. 2019)
and student admissions (Waters and Miikkulainen 2014), predict criminal recidivism
(Dressel and Farid 2018), and identify military targets (Nasrabadi 2014), to name
just a few controversial examples. Failure to properly screen training datasets for
biased inputs threatens to automate injustices already present in society (Mittelstadt
et al. 2016). For instance, studies have indicated that algorithmic profiling consistently
shows online advertisements for higher paying jobs to men over women (Datta et al.
2015); that facial recognition software is often trained on predominantly white sub-
jects, making them inaccurate classifiers for black and brown faces (Buolamwini and
Gebru 2018); and that predatory lenders use financial data to disproportionately target
poor communities (Eubanks 2018). Critics point to these failures and argue that there is
a dearth of fairness, accountability, and transparency in ML—collectively acronymised
as FAT ML, an annual conference on the subject that began meeting in 2014.
Proponents of FAT ML were only somewhat mollified by the European Union’s
2018 General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR), which includes language sug-
gesting a so-called “right to explanation” for citizens subject to automated decisions.
Whether or not the GDPR in fact guarantees such a right—some commentators insist
that it does (Goodman and Flaxman 2017; Selbst and Powles 2017), while others
challenge this reading (Edwards and Veale 2017; Wachter et al. 2017)—there is no
question that policymakers are beginning to seriously consider the social impact
of ML, and perhaps even take preliminary steps towards regulating the industries
that rely on such technologies (HLEGAI 2019; OECD 2019). Any attempt to do so,
however, will require the technical ability to audit algorithms in order to rigorously
test whether they discriminate on the basis of protected attributes such as race and
gender (Barocas and Selbst 2016).
2.2 The context of (algorithmic) justification
Shifting from ethical to epistemological concerns, many iML researchers emphasise
that their tools can help debug algorithms that do not perform properly. The classic
problem in this context is overfitting, which occurs when a model predicts well on
training data but fails on test data. This happened, for example, with a recent image
classifier designed to distinguish between farm animals (Lapuschkin et al. 2016). The
model attained 100% accuracy on in-sample evaluations but mislabelled all the horses
in a subsequent test set. Close examination revealed that the training data included
a small watermark on all and only the horse images. The algorithm had learned to
associate the label “horse” not with equine features, as one might have hoped, but
merely with this uninformative trademark.
The phenomenon of overfitting, well known and widely feared in the ML commu-
nity, will perhaps be familiar to epistemologists as a sort of algorithmic Gettier case
(Gettier 1963). If a high-performing image classifier assigns the label “horse” to a
photograph of a horse, then we have a justified true belief that this picture depicts a
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horse. But when that determination is made on the basis of a watermark, something
is not quite right. Our path to the fact is somehow crooked, coincidental. The model
is right for the wrong reasons. Any true judgments made on this basis are merely
cases of epistemic luck, as when we correctly tell the time by looking at a clock that
stopped exactly 24 hours before.
Attempts to circumvent problems like this typically involve some effort to ensure
that agents and propositions stand in the proper relation, i.e. that some reliable method
connects knower and knowledge. Process reliabilism was famously championed by
Goldman (1979), who arguably led the vanguard of what Williams calls “the reliabilist
revolution” (2016) in anglophone epistemology. Floridi (2004) demonstrates the logi-
cal unsolvability of the Gettier problem (in non-statistical contexts), while his network
theory of account (2012) effectively establishes a pragmatic, reliabilist workaround.
Advances in iML represent a statistical answer to the reliabilist challenge, enabling
sceptics to analyse the internal behaviour of a model when deliberating on particular
predictions. This is the goal, for instance, of all local linear approximation techniques,
including popular iML algorithms like LIME (Ribeiro et al. 2016) and SHAP (Lund-
berg and Lee 2017), which assign weights to input variables so users can verify that the
model has not improperly focused on uninformative features like the aforementioned
watermark. These methods will be examined more closely in Sect. 6.
2.3 The context of (algorithmic) discovery
We consider one final motivation for iML: discovery. This subject has so far received
relatively little attention in the literature. However, we argue that it could in fact turn out
to be one of the most important achievements of the entire algorithmic explainability
project, and therefore deserves special attention.
Suppose we design an algorithm to predict subtypes of some poorly understood
disease using biomolecular data. The model is remarkably accurate. It unambiguously
classifies patients into distinct groups with markedly different prognostic trajectories.
Its predictions are robust and reliable, providing clinicians with actionable advice on
treatment options and suggesting new avenues for future research. In this case, we want
iML methods not to audit for fairness or test for overfitting, but to reveal underlying
mechanisms. The algorithm has clearly learned to identify and exploit some subtle
signal that has so far defied human detection. If we want to learn more about the target
system, then iML techniques applied to a well-specified model offer a relatively cheap
and effective way to identify key features and generate new hypotheses.
The case is not purely hypothetical. A wave of research in the early 2000s estab-
lished a connection between transcriptomic signatures and clinical outcomes for breast
cancer patients (e.g., Sørlie et al. 2001; van’t Veer et al. 2002; van de Vijver et al. 2002).
The studies employed a number of sophisticated statistical techniques, including unsu-
pervised clustering and survival analysis. Researchers found, among other things, a
strong association between BRCA1 mutations and basal-like breast cancer, an espe-
cially aggressive form of the disease. Genomic analysis remains one of the most active
and promising areas of research in the natural sciences, and whole new subfields of
ML have emerged to tackle the unique challenges presented by these high-dimensional
123
Synthese
datasets (Bühlmann et al. 2016; Hastie et al. 2015). Successful iML strategies will be
crucial to realising the promise of high-throughput sciences.
3 Formal background
In this section, we introduce concepts and notation that will be used throughout the
remainder of the paper. Specifically, we review the basic formalisms of supervised
learning, causal interventionism, and decision theory.
3.1 Supervised learning
The goal in supervised learning is to estimate a function that maps a set of predictor
variables to some outcome(s) of interest. To discuss learning algorithms with any
formal clarity, we must make reference to values, variables, vectors, and matrices. We
denote scalar values using lowercase italicised letters, e.g. x. Variables, by contrast,
are identified by uppercase italicized letters, e.g. X. Matrices, which consist of rows
of observations and columns of variables, are denoted by uppercase boldfaced letters,
e.g. X. We sometimes index values and variables using matrix notation, such that the
ith element of variable X is xi and the jth variable of the matrix X is Xj. The scalar xij
refers to the ith element of the jth variable in X. When referring to a row-vector, such
as the coordinates that identify the ith observation in X, we use lowercase, boldfaced,
and italicised notation, e.g. xi.
Each observation in a training dataset consists of a pair zi  (xi, yi), where xi
denotes a point in d-dimensional space, xi  (xi1, …, xid), and yi represents the
corresponding outcome. We assume that samples are independently and identically
distributed according to some fixed but unknown joint probability distribution P(Z) 
P(X, Y ). Using n observations, an algorithm maps a dataset to a function, a: Z → f ;
the function in turn maps features to outcomes, f : X →Y . We consider both cases
where Y is categorical (in which case f is a classifier) and where Y is continuous (in
which case f is a regressor). We make no additional assumptions about the structure
or properties of f .
Model f is judged by its ability to generalise, i.e. to accurately predict outcomes on
test data sampled from P(Z) but not included in the training dataset. For a given test
sample xi, we compute the predicted outcome f (xi)  yˆi and observe the true outcome
yi. The hat symbol denotes that the value has been estimated. A model’s performance
is measured by a loss function L, which quantifies the distance between Y and Yˆ over
a set of test cases. The expected value of this loss function with respect to P(Z) for a
given model f is called the risk:
R( f , Z)  EZ[L( f , Z)] (1)
We estimate this population parameter with the empirical risk over a set of n sam-
ples:




L( f , zi ) (2)
123
Synthese
A learning algorithm is said to be consistent if empirical risk converges to true risk as
n → ∞. A fundamental result of statistical learning theory states that an algorithm is
consistent if and only if the space of functions it can learn is of finite VC dimension
(Vapnik and Chervonenkis 1971). This latter parameter is a capacity measure defined
as the cardinality of the largest set of points the algorithm can shatter.1 The finite
VC dimension criterion will be important to define convergence conditions for the
explanation game in Sect. 5.3.
Some philosophers have argued that statistical learning provides a rigorous foun-
dation for all inductive reasoning (Corfield et al. 2009; Harman and Kulkarni 2007).
Although we are sympathetic to this position, none of the proceeding analysis depends
upon this thesis.
3.2 Causal interventionism
Philosophers often distinguish between causal explanations (for natural events) and
personal reasons (for human decisions). It is also common—though extremely mis-
leading—to speak of algorithmic “decisions”. Thus, we may be tempted to seek
reasons rather than causes for algorithmic predictions, on the grounds that they are
more decision-like than event-like. We argue that this is mistaken in several respects.
First, the talk of algorithmic “decisions” is an anthropomorphic trope granting statis-
tical models a degree of autonomy that dangerously downplays the true role of human
agency in sociotechnical systems (Watson 2019). Second, we may want to explain
not just the top label selected by a classifier—the so-called “decision”—but also the
complete probability distribution over possible labels. In a regression context, we may
want to explain a prediction interval in addition to a mere point estimate. Finally, there
are good pragmatic reasons to take a causal approach to this problem. As we argue
in Sect. 4, it is relatively easy and highly informative to simulate the effect of causal
interventions on supervised learning models, provided sufficient access.
Our approach therefore builds on the causal interventionist framework originally
formalised by Pearl (2000) and Spirtes et al. (2000), and later given more philosophical
treatment by Woodward (2003, 2008, 2010, 2015). A minimal explication of the theory
runs as follows. X is a cause of Y within a given structural model M if and only if
some hypothetical intervention on X (and no other variable) would result in a change
in Y or the probability distribution of Y . This account is minimal in the sense that it
places no constraints on M and imposes no causal efficacy thresholds on X or Y . The
notion of an intervention is kept maximally broad to allow for any possible change in
X, provided it does not alter the values of other variables in M except those that are
causal descendants of X.
Under certain common assumptions,2 Pearl’s do-calculus provides a complete set
of formal tools for reasoning about causal interventions (Huang and Valtorta 2006). A
1 The class of sets C shatters the set A if and only if for each a ⊂ A, there exists some c ∈ C such that
a  c ∩ A. For more on VC theory, see (Vapnik 1995, 1998). Popper’s “degree of falsifiability” arguably
anticipates the VC dimension. For a discussion, see Corfield et al. (2009).
2 The completeness of the do-calculus relies on the causal Markov and faithfulness conditions, which
together state (roughly) that statistical independence implies graphical independence and vice versa. Neither
assumption has gone unchallenged. We refer interested readers to Hausman and Woodward (2004) and
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Fig. 1 Two examples of simple causal models. a A Markovian graph. Two exogenous variables, UX and UY ,
have unobserved causal effects on two endogenous variables, X and Y , respectively. b A semi-Markovian
graph. A single exogenous variable, U, has unobserved confounding effects on two endogenous variables,
X and Y
key element of Pearl’s notation system is the do operator, which allows us to denote,
for example, the probability of Y , conditional on an intervention that sets variable X
to value x, with the concise formula P(Y |do(X  x)). A structural causal model M
is a tuple 〈U, V, F〉 consisting of exogenous variables U, endogenous variables V,
and a set of functions F that map each Vj’s causal antecedents to its observed values.
M may be visually depicted as a graph with nodes corresponding to variables and
directed edges denoting causal relations between them (see Fig. 1). We restrict our
attention here to directed acyclic graphs (DAGs), which are the focus of most work in
causal interventionism.
If the model M contains no exogenous confounders, then M is said to be Marko-
vian. In this case, factorisation of a graph’s joint distribution is straightforward and
causal effects can be computed directly from the data. However, when one or more
unobserved variables has a confounding effect on two or more observed variables, as
in Fig. 1b, then we say that M is semi-Markovian, and more elaborate methods are
needed to estimate causal effects. Specifically, some sort of adjustment must be made
by conditioning on an appropriate set of covariates. While several overlapping formu-
lations have been proposed for such adjustments (Galles and Pearl 1995; Pearl 1995;
Robins 1997), we follow Tian and Pearl (2002), who provide a provably sound and
complete set of causal identifiability conditions for semi-Markovian models (Huang
and Valtorta 2008; Shpitser and Pearl 2008).
Their criteria are as follows. The causal effect of the endogenous variable Vj on all
observed covariates V−j is identifiable if and only if there is no consecutive sequence
of confounding edges between Vj and Vj ’s immediate successors in the graph. Weaker
conditions are sufficient when we focus on a proper subset S ⊂ V. In this case, P(S|do(
Vj  vi j
)) is identifiable so long as there is no consecutive sequence of confounding
edges between Vj and Vj’s children in the subgraph composed of the ancestors of S.
We take it that the goal in most iML applications is to provide a causal explanation
for one or more algorithmic outputs. Identifiability is therefore a central concern, and
another key component to defining convergence conditions in Sect. 5.3. Fortunately,
as we argue in Sect. 4.1, many cases of interest in this setting involve Markovian
graphs, and therefore need no covariate adjustments. Semi-Markovian alternatives are
Footnote 2 continued




Table 1 Utility matrix for John
when deciding whether or not to
pack his umbrella
c1: Rain c2: No rain
a1: Umbrella 1 − 1
a2: No umbrella − 2 0
considered in Sect. 5.2.2, although guarantees cannot generally be provided in such
instances without additional assumptions.
If successful, a causal explanation for some algorithmic prediction(s) will accurately
answer a range of what Woodward calls “what-if-things-had-been-different questions”
(henceforth w-questions). For instance, we may want to know what feature(s) about an
individual caused her loan application to be denied. What if she had been wealthier?
Or older? Would a hypothetical applicant identical to the original except along the axis
of wealth or age have had more luck? Several authors in the iML literature explicitly
endorse such a counterfactual strategy (Kusner et al. 2017; Wachter et al. 2018). We
revisit these methods in Sect. 6.
3.3 Decision theory
Decision theory provides formal tools for reasoning about choices under uncer-
tainty. These will prove useful when attempting to quantify explanatory relevance
in Sect. 5.2.3. We assume the typical setup, in which an individual considers a finite
set of actions A and a finite set of outcomes C. According to expected utility theory,3
an agent’s rational preferences may be expressed as a utility function u that maps the
Cartesian product of A and C to the real numbers, u: A ×C →R. For instance, Jones
may be unsure whether to pack his umbrella today. He could do so (a1), but it would
add considerable bulk and weight to his bag; or he could leave it at home (a2) and risk
getting wet. The resulting utility matrix is depicted in Table 1.
The rational choice for Jones depends not just on his utility function u but also
on his beliefs about whether or not it will rain. These are formally expressed by a
(subjective) probability distribution over C, P(C). We compute each action’s expected
utility by taking a weighted average over outcomes:





ai , c j
) (3)
where the set of evidence E is either empty (in which case Eq. 3 denotes a prior
expectation) or contains some relevant evidence (in which case Eq. 3 represents a pos-
terior expectation). Posterior probabilities are calculated in accordance with Bayes’s
theorem:
P(ci |E)  P(E |ci )P(ci )
P(E)
(4)
3 The von Neumann-Morgenstern representation theorem guarantees the uniqueness (up to affine trans-
formation) of the rational utility function u, provided an agent’s preferences adhere to the following four
axioms: completeness, transitivity, independence of irrelevant alternatives, and continuity. For the original
derivation, see von Neumann and Morgenstern (1944).
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which follows directly from the Kolmogorov axioms for the probability calculus (Kol-




EC [u(ai , C)|E] (5)
An ideal epistemic agent always selects (one of) the optimal action(s) a* from a set
of alternatives.
It is important to note how a rational agent’s beliefs interact with his utilities to
guide decisions. If Jones is maximally uncertain about whether or not it will rain, then
he assigns equal probability to both outcomes, resulting in expected utilities of
EC [u(a1, C)]  0.5(1) + 0.5(−1)  0
and
EC [u(a2, C)]  0.5(−2) + 0.5(0)  −1,
respectively. In this case, Jones should pack his umbrella. But say he gains some new
information E that changes his beliefs. Perhaps he sees a weather report that puts the
chance of rain at just 10%. Then he will have the following expected utilities:
EC [u(a1, C)|E]  0.1(1) + 0.9(−1)  −0.8
EC [u(a2, C)|E]  0.1(−2) + 0.9(0)  −0.2
In this case, leaving the umbrella at home is the optimal choice for Jones.
Of course, humans can be notoriously irrational. Experiments in psychology and
behavioural economics have shown time and again that people rely on heuristics and
cognitive biases instead of consistently applying the axioms of decision theory or
probability calculus (Kahneman 2011). Thus, the concepts and principles we outline
here are primarily normative. They prescribe an optimal course of behaviour, a sort
of Kantian regulative ideal when utilities and probabilities are precise, and posterior
distributions are properly calculated. For the practical purposes of iML, these values
may be estimated via a hybrid system in which software aids an inquisitive individual
with bounded rationality. We revisit these issues in Sect. 7.1.
4 Scope
Supervised learning algorithms provide some unique affordances that differentiate
iML from more general explanation tasks. This is because the target in iML is not
the natural or social phenomenon the algorithm was designed to predict, but rather
the algorithm itself . In other words, we are interested not in the underlying joint
distribution P(Z)  P(X, Y ), but in the estimated joint distribution P(Zf )  P(X, Yˆ ).
The distinction is crucial.
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Strevens (2013) differentiates between three modes of understanding: that, why,
and with.4 Understanding that some proposition p is true is simply to be aware that p.
Understanding why p is true requires some causal explanation for p. Strevens’s third
kind of understanding, however, applies only to theories or models. Understanding
with a model amounts to knowing how to apply it in order to predict or explain real
or potential phenomena. For instance, a physicist who uses Newtonian mechanics to
explain the motion of billiard balls thereby demonstrates her ability to understand with
the theory. Since this model is strictly speaking false, it would be incorrect to say that
her explanation provides a true understanding of why the billiard balls move as they
do. (Of course, she could be forgiven for sparing her poolhall companions the rela-
tivistic details of metric tensors and spacetime curvature in this case.) Yet our physicist
has clearly understood something—namely the Newtonian theory itself—even if the
classical account she offers is inaccurate or incomplete. Similarly, the goal in iML is
to help epistemic agents understand with the target model f , independent of whatever
realities f was intended to capture. The situation is slightly more complicated in the
case of discovery (Sect. 2.3). The strategy here is to use understanding with as an
indirect path to understanding why, on the assumption that if model f performs well
then it has probably learned some valuable information about the target system.
Despite the considerable complexity of some statistical models, as a class they tend
to be complete, precise, and forthcoming. These three properties simplify the effort to
explain any complex system.
4.1 Complete
Model f is complete with respect to the input features X in the sense that exogenous
variables have no influence whatsoever on predicted outcomes Yˆ . Whereas nature is full
of unobserved confounders that may complicate or undermine even a well-designed
study, fitted models are self-contained systems impervious to external variation. They
therefore instantiate Markovian, rather than semi-Markovian graphs. This is true even
if dependencies between predictors are not explicitly modelled, in which case we may
depict f as a simple DAG with directed edges from each feature X1, . . . , Xd to Yˆ .
In what follows, we presume that the agents in question know which variables
were used to train f . This may not always be the case in practice, and without such
knowledge it becomes considerably more difficult to explain algorithmic predictions.
Whatever the epistemic status of the inquiring agent(s), however, the underlying model
itself remains complete.
Issues arise when endogenous variables serve as proxies for exogenous variables.
For instance, a model may not explicitly include a protected attribute such as race,
but instead use a seemingly innocuous covariate like zip code, which is often a strong
predictor of race (Datta et al. 2017). In this case, an intervention that changes a subject’s
race will have no impact on model f ’s predictions unless we take the additional step
of embedding f in a larger causal structure M that includes a directed edge from race
4 In what follows, we take it more or less for granted that explanations promote understanding and that
understanding requires explanations. Both claims have been disputed. For a discussion, see de Regt et al.
(2009), Grimm (2006) and Khalifa (2012). We revisit the relationship between these concepts in Sect. 7.3.
123
Synthese
to zip code. We consider possible strategies for resolving problems of this nature in
Sect. 5.2.2.
4.2 Precise
Model f is precise in the sense that it always returns the same output for any par-
ticular set of inputs. Whereas a given experimental procedure may result in different
outcomes over repeated trials due to irreducible noise, a fitted model has no such inter-
nal variability. Some simulation-based approaches, such as the Markov chain Monte
Carlo methods widely used in Bayesian data analysis, pose a notable exception to this
rule. These models make predictions by random sampling, a stochastic process whose
final output is a posterior distribution, not a point estimate. However, if the model
has converged, then these predictions are still precise in the limit. As the number of
draws from the posterior grows, statistics of interest (e.g., the posterior mode or mean)
stabilise to their final values. The Monte Carlo variance of a given parameter can be
bounded as a function of the sample size using well-known concentration inequalities
(Boucheron et al. 2013).
Woodward (2003, 2010) emphasises the role of “stability” in causal generalisations,
a concept that resembles what we call precision. The difference is that stability in
Woodward’s sense can only be applied to a proper subset of the edges (usually just a
single edge) in a causal graph. The generalisation that “variable X causes variable Y”
is stable to the extent that it persists across a wide range of background conditions,
i.e. alternative states of the model M. Precision in our sense requires completeness,
because it applies only to the causal relationship between the set of all predictors X
and the outcome Y , which is strictly deterministic at the token level.
4.3 Forthcoming
Model f is forthcoming in the sense that it will always provide an output for any
well-formed input. Moreover, it is typically quite fast and cheap to query an algo-
rithm in this way. Whereas experiments in the natural or social sciences can often be
time-consuming, inconclusive, expensive, or even dangerous, it is relatively simple
to answer w-questions in supervised learning contexts. In principle, an analyst could
even recreate the complete joint distribution P(X, Yˆ ) simply by saturating the feature
space with w-questions. Of course, this strategy is computationally infeasible with
continuous predictors and/or a design matrix of even moderate dimensionality.
Supervised learning algorithms may be less than forthcoming when shielded by
intellectual property (IP) laws, which can also prevent researchers from accessing a
model’s complete list of predictors. In lieu of an open access programming interface,
some iML researchers resort to reverse engineering algorithms from training datasets
with known predicted values. This was the case, for instance, with a famous ProPub-
lica investigation into the COMPAS algorithm, a proprietary model used by courts in
several US states to predict the risk of criminal recidivism (Angwin et al. 2016; Larson
et al. 2016). Subsequent studies using the same dataset reached different conclusions
regarding the algorithm’s reliance on race (Fisher et al. 2019; Rudin et al. 2018), high-
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lighting the inherent uncertainty of model reconstruction when the target algorithm is
not forthcoming. In what follows, we focus on the ideal case in which our agents face
no IP restrictions.
5 The explanation game
In this section, we introduce a formal framework for iML. Our proposal takes the
form of a game in which an inquisitor (call her Alice) seeks an explanation for an
algorithmic prediction f (xi)  yˆi . Note that our target (at this stage) is a local or token
explanation, rather than a global or type explanation. In other words, Alice wants
to know why this particular input resulted in that particular output, as opposed to the
more general task of recreating the entire decision boundary or regression surface of f .
Unfortunately for Alice, f is a black box. But she is not alone. She is helped by
a devoted accomplice (call him Bob), who does everything in his power to aid Alice
in understanding yˆi . Bob’s goal is to get Alice to a point where she can correctly
predict f ’s outputs, at least in the neighbourhood of xi and within some tolerable
margin of error. In other words, he wants her to be able to give true answers to relevant
w-questions about how f would respond to hypothetical datapoints near xi.
We make several nontrivial assumptions about Alice and Bob, some of which were
foreshadowed above. Specifically:
• Alice is a rational agent. Her preferences over alternatives are complete and transi-
tive, she integrates new evidence through Bayesian updating, and she does her best
to maximise expected utility subject to constraints on her cognitive/computational
resources.
• Bob is Alice’s accomplice. He has data on the features V 
(
X1, . . . , Xd , Yˆ
)
that
are endogenous to f , as well a (possibly empty) set of exogenous variables U 
(Xd+1, …, Xd+m) that are of potential interest to Alice. He may query f with any
well-formed input at little or no cost.
We could easily envision more complex explanation games in which some or all of
these assumptions are relaxed. Future work will examine such alternatives.
5.1 Three desiderata
According to Woodward (2003, p. 203), the following three criteria are individually
necessary and jointly sufficient to explain some outcome of interest Y  yi that obtains
when X  xj within a given structural model M:
(i) The generalisations described by M are accurate, or at least approximately so,
as are the observations Y  yi and X  xj.
(ii) According to M, Y  yi under an intervention that sets X to xj.
(iii) There exists some possible intervention that sets X to xk (where xj xk), with




This theory poses no small number of complications that are beyond the scope of this
paper.5 We adopt the framework as a useful baseline for analysis, as it is sufficiently
flexible to allow for extensions in a number of directions.
5.1.1 Accuracy
Woodward’s account places a well-justified premium on explanatory accuracy. Any
explanation that fails to meet criteria (i)–(iii) is not deserving of the name. However,
this theory does not tell the whole story. To see why, consider a deep convolutional
neural network f trained to classify images. The model correctly predicts that xi depicts
a cat. Alice would like to know why. Bob attempts to explain the prediction by writing
out the complete formula for f . The neural network contains some hundred layers,
each composed of 1 million parameters that together describe a complex nonlinear
mapping from pixels to labels. Bob checks against Woodward’s criteria and observes
that his model M is accurate, as are the input and output values; that M correctly
predicts the output given the input; and that interventions on the original photograph
replacing the cat with a dog do in fact change the predicted label from “cat” to “dog”.
Problem solved? Not quite. Bob’s causal graph M is every bit as opaque as the
underlying model f . In fact, the two are identical. So while this explanation may be
maximally accurate, it is far too complex to be of any use to Alice. The result is not
unlike the map of Borges’s famous short story (1946), in which imperial cartographers
aspire to such exactitude that they draw their territory on a 1:1 scale. Black box expla-
nations of this sort create a kind of Chinese room (Searle 1980), in which the inquiring
agent is expected to manually perform the algorithm’s computations in order to trace
the path from input to output. Just as the protagonist of Searle’s thought experiment
has no understanding of the Chinese characters he successfully manipulates, so Alice
gains no explanatory knowledge about f by instantiating the model herself. Unless
she is comfortable computing high-dimensional tensor products on the fly, Alice can-
not use M to build a mental model of the target system f or its behaviour near xi.
She cannot answer relevant w-questions without consulting the program, which will
merely provide her with new labels that are as unexplained as the original.
5.1.2 Simplicity
Accuracy is a necessary but insufficient condition for successful explanation, espe-
cially when the underlying system is too complex for the inquiring agent to fully
comprehend. In these cases, we tend to value simplicity as an inherent virtue of can-
didate explanations. The point is hardly novel. Simplicity has been cited as a primary
goal of scientific theories by practically everyone who has considered the question
(cf. Baker 2016). The point is not lost on iML researchers, who typically impose
sparsity constraints on possible solutions to ensure a manageable number of nonzero
parameters (e.g., Angelino et al. 2018; Ribeiro et al. 2016; Wachter et al. 2018).
5 For book length treatments of the topic, see Halpern (2016), Strevens (2010) and Woodward (2003).
For relevant articles, see, e.g. Franklin-Hall (2014), Kinney (2018), Potochnik (2015), Weslake (2010) and
Woodward and Hitchcock (2003).
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It is not always clear just what explanatory simplicity amounts to in algorithmic
contexts. One plausible candidate, advocated by Popper (1959), is based on the number
of free parameters. In statistical learning theory, this proposal has largely been super-
seded by capacity measures like the aforementioned VC dimension or Rademacher
complexity. These parameters help to establish a syntactic notion of simplicity, which
has proven especially fruitful in statistics. Yet such definitions obscure the semantic
aspect of simplicity, which is probably of greater interest to epistemic agents like
Alice. The kind of simplicity required for her to understand why f (xi)  yˆi depends
not just upon the functional relationships between the units of explanation, but more
importantly upon the explanatory level of abstraction (Floridi 2008a)—i.e., the choice
of units themselves.
Rather than adjudicate between the various competing notions of simplicity that
abound in the literature, we opt for a purely relational approach upon which simplicity
is just equated with intelligibility for Alice. We are unconvinced that there is any sense
to be made of an absolute, mind-independent notion of simplicity. Yet even if there is,
it would be of little use to Alice if we insist that explanation g1 is simpler than g2 on our
preferred definition of the term, despite the empirical evidence that she understands the
implications of the latter better than the former. What is simple for some agents may
be complex for others, depending on background knowledge and contextual factors.
In Sect. 5.2, we operationalise this observation by measuring simplicity in explicitly
agentive terms.
5.1.3 Relevance
Some may judge accuracy and simplicity to be sufficient for successful explanation,
and in many cases they probably are. But there are important exceptions to this general-
isation. Consider, for example, the following case. A (bad) bank issues loans according
to just two criteria: applicants must be either white or wealthy. This bank operates in
a jurisdiction in which race alone is a protected attribute. A poor black woman named
Alice is denied a loan and requests an explanation. The bank informs her that her
application was denied due to her finances. This explanation is accurate and simple.
However, it is also disingenuous—for it would be just as accurate and simple to say
that her loan was denied because of her race, a result that would be of far greater rele-
vance both to Alice and state regulators. Given Alice’s interests, the latter explanation
is superior to the former, yet the bank’s explanation has effectively eclipsed it.
This is a fundamental observation: among the class of accurate and simple explana-
tions, some will be more or less relevant to the inquiring agent (Floridi 2008b). Alice
has entered into this game for a reason. Something hangs in the balance. Perhaps she is
a loan applicant deciding whether to sue a bank, or a doctor deciding whether to trust
an unexpected diagnosis. A successful explanation will not only need to be accurate
and simple; it must also inform her decision about how best to proceed. Otherwise, we
have a case of counterfactual eclipse, in which an agent’s interests are overshadowed
by a narrow focus on irrelevant facts that do nothing to advance her understanding or
help modify future behaviours.
The problem of counterfactual eclipse is a serious issue in any context where
customers or patients, for example, may wish to receive (or perhaps exercise their right
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to) an explanation. However, we are unaware of any proposal in the iML literature that
explicitly protects against this possibility.
Algorithm 1: The Explanation Game
Inputs:
Environment: supervised learner f, endogenous variables V, data D ~ ℙ(ℳ) possibly 
including exogenous covariates U
Alice: explanandum f(xi) = , contrastive outcome f(xi) ≠ , level of abstraction LoA, choice 
set A, causal hypotheses C, utility function u, prior distribution over causal hypotheses ℙ(C), 
function space ℋ, loss function ℋ
Bob: set of B unique function spaces , loss function , kernel . If exogenous variables 
are relevant, then an additional function space ′, loss function ′ , kernel ′
for each round:
(1) Bob creates a map : → from the original f-space to an explanatory g-space 
designed to (a) shift the input distribution to Alice’s desired LoA and (b) help provide 
evidence for or against at least one hypothesis in C. Whereas Zf = (X, ), Zg = (X′, Y′).
if X′ includes variables U that are exogenous to f:
(2) Bob trains the model g′: V → U, optionally fit using kernel ′ , to minimize loss 
′ over function space ′. 
(3) Bob creates a training dataset by sampling points from a distribution centred 
at and repeatedly querying g′ with w-questions of the form ℳ[ | ( = )]
= ? The resulting data are mapped to g-space via .
end if
for each function space :
(4) Bob creates a training dataset by sampling points from a distribution centred 
at and repeatedly querying f with w-questions of the form [ | ( = )] =
? The resulting data are mapped to g-space via . 
(5) Bob trains a model g: X′ → Y′, optionally fit using kernel , to minimize loss 
over function space . Empirical risk is calculated in f-space via the inverse 
mapping −1, optionally weighted by .
(6) Alice creates a training dataset by repeatedly querying g with w-questions of the 
form [ ′ | ′ = ′ ] = ? Bob reports both the predicted outcome and the 
empirical risk. 
(7) Alice trains a model h: X′ → Y′ to minimize loss ℋ over function space ℋ.
Empirical risk is optionally weighted by and estimated in g-space. 
(8) The information Alice learns from and about g and h constitutes a body of 
evidence E, which she uses to update her beliefs regarding C. 
(9) Alice calculates the posterior expected utility of each action in A, producing at 
least one optimal choice a*. 
Outputs: emp , , emp ℎ, , [ ( ∗, )| ]
end for
end for
5.2 Rules of the game
Having motivated an emphasis on accuracy, simplicity, and relevance, we now artic-
ulate formal constraints that impose these desiderata on explanations in iML. A
schematic overview of the explanation game is provided in pseudocode.
This game has a lot of moving parts, but at its core the process is quite straight-
forward. Essentially, Bob does his best to proffer an accurate explanation in terms
that Alice can understand. She learns by asking w-questions until she feels confi-
dent enough to answer such questions herself. The result is scored by three measures:
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accuracy (error of Bob’s model), simplicity (error of Alice’s model), and relevance
(expected utility for Alice). Note that all explanations are indexed by their corre-
sponding map ψ and explanatory function space Gb. We suppress the dependency for
notational convenience. All inputs and steps are discussed in greater detail below.
5.2.1 Inputs
Alice must specify a contrastive outcome f (xi)  y˜i ∈ Y . This counterfactual alter-
native may represent Alice’s initial expectation or desired response. Consider, for
example, a case in which f is trained to distinguish between handwritten digits, a
classic benchmark problem in ML commonly referred to as MNIST, after the most
famous database of such images.6 Say f misclassifies xi as a “7”, when in fact yi 
“1”. Alice wants to know not just why the model predicted “7”, but also why it did not
predict “1”. Specifying an alternative y˜i is important, as it focuses Bob’s attention on
relevant regions of the feature space. An explanation such as “Because xi has no closed
loops” may explain why f did not predict “8” or “9”, but that is of little use to Alice,
as it eclipses the relevant explanation. The importance of contrastive explanation is
highlighted by several philosophers (Hitchcock 1999; Potochnik 2015; van Fraassen
1980), and has recently begun to receive attention in the iML literature as well (Miller
2019; Mittelstadt et al. 2019).
We require that Alice state some desired level of abstraction (LoA). The LoA
specifies a set of typed variables and observables that are used to describe a system.
Inspired by the Formal Methods literature in computer science (Boca et al. 2010),
the levelist approach has been extended to conceptualise a wide array of problems in
the philosophy of information (Floridi 2008a, 2011, 2017). Alice’s desired LoA will
help Bob establish the preferred units of explanation, a crucial step toward ensuring
intelligibility for Alice. In the MNIST example, Alice is unlikely to seek explanations
at the pixel-LoA, but may be satisfied with a higher LoA that deals in curves and
edges.
Pragmatism demands that Alice have some notion why she is playing this game.
Her choices A, preferences u, and beliefs P(C) will guide Bob in his effort to supply
a satisfactory explanation and constrain the set of possible solutions. The MNIST
example is a case of iML for validation (Sect. 2.2), in which Alice’s choice set may
include the option to deploy or not deploy the model f . Her degrees of belief with
respect to various causal hypotheses are determined by her expertise in the data and
model. Perhaps it is well known that algorithms struggle to differentiate between “7”
and “1” when the former appears without a horizontal line through the digit. The cost
of such a mistake is factored into her utility function.
Bob, for his part, enters into the game with three key components: (i) a set of B ≥ 1
candidate algorithms for explanation; (ii) a loss function with which to train these
algorithms; and (iii) a corresponding kernel. Popular options for (i) include sparse
linear models and rule lists. The loss function is left unspecified, but common choices
include mean squared error for regression and cross-entropy for classification. The
6 The Modified National Institute of Standards and Technology database contains 60,000 training images
and 10,000 test images, each 28×28 pixel grayscale photos of digits hand-written either by American high
school students or United States Census Bureau employees. See http://yann.lecun.com/exdb/mnist/.
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kernel tunes the locality of the explanation, weighting observations by their distance
from the original input xi, as measured by some appropriate metric. Whether the kernel
is used to train the model g or simply evaluate g’s empirical risk is left up to Bob.
Abandoning the kernel altogether results in a global explanation, with no particular
emphasis on the neighbourhood of xi.
Bob may need an additional algorithm, loss function, and kernel to estimate the
relationship between endogenous and exogenous features. If so, there is no obvious
requirement that such a model be intelligible to Alice or Bob, so long as it achieves
minimal predictive error.
5.2.2 Mapping the space
Perhaps the most consequential step in the entire game is Bob’s mapping ψ : Z f →
Zg . In an effort to provide a successful explanation for Alice, Bob projects the input
distribution P(Zf )  P(X, Yˆ ) into a new space P(Zg)  P(X′, Y ′). The change in
the response variable is set by Alice’s contrastive outcome of interest. In the MNIST
example, Bob maps the original 10-class variable Yˆ onto a binary variable Y ′ indicating
whether or not inputs are classified as “1”. The contents of X′ may be iteratively
established by considering Alice’s desired LoA and hypothesis set C. This will often
amount to a reduction of the feature space. For instance, Bob may coarsen a set of
genes into a smaller collection of biological pathways (Sanguinetti and Huynh-Thu
2018), or transform pixels into super-pixels (Stutz et al. 2018).
Alternatively, Bob may need to expand the input features to include exogenous
variables hypothesized to be relevant to the outcome. In this case, he will require
external data D sampled from the expanded feature space P(M), which can be used
to train one or more auxiliary models to predict values for the extra covariate(s)
in unobserved regions of g-space. For instance, when an algorithm is suspected of
encoding protected attributes like race via unprotected attributes like zip code, Bob
will need to estimate the dependence using a new function g′ that predicts the former
based on the latter (along with any other relevant endogenous variables). Note that in
this undertaking, Bob is essentially back to square one. The target M is presumably
not complete, precise, or forthcoming, and his task therefore reduces to the more
general problem of modelling some complex natural or social system with limited
information. This inevitably introduces new sources of error that will have a negative
impact on downstream results. Depending on the structure of the underlying causal
graph, effects of interventions in g-space may not be uniquely identifiable.
In any event, the goal at this stage is to make the input features sufficiently intel-
ligible to Alice that they can accommodate her likely w-questions and inform her
beliefs about causal hypotheses C. General purpose methods for causal feature learn-
ing have been proposed (Chalupka et al. 2017), however, critics have persuasively
argued that such procedures cannot be implemented in a context-independent manner
(Kinney 2018). Some areas of research, such as bioinformatics and computer vision,
have well-established conventions on how to coarsen high-dimensional feature spaces.
Other domains may prove more challenging. Accessibility to external data on exoge-
nous variables of interest will likewise vary from case to case. Even when such datasets
are readily available, there is no guarantee that the functional relationships sought can
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be estimated with high accuracy or precision. As in any other explanatory context,
Alice and Bob must do the best they can with their available resources and knowl-
edge.
5.2.3 Building models, scoring explanations
Once ψ is fixed, the next steps in the explanation game are effectively supervised
learning problems. This puts at Alice and Bob’s disposal a wide range of well-studied
algorithms and imports the corresponding statistical guarantees.




and fits a model g from the explana-
tory function space Gb. Alice explores g-space by asking a number of w-questions that
posit relevant interventions. For instance, she may want to know if the presence of
a horizontal line through the middle of a numeral determines whether f predicts a
“7”. If so, then this will be a hypothesis in C and we should find a corresponding
variable in X′. Because we leave open the possibility that the target model f and/or
Bob’s explanation g may involve implicit or explicit structural equations, we use the
do-calculus to formalise such interventions.
Bob and Alice can select whatever combination of loss function and algorithm
makes the most sense for their given explanation task. g’s error is measured by Remp(g,
Zf ); g’s complexity is measured by Remp(h, Zg). We say that g is ε1-accurate if Remp(g,
Zf ) ≤ ε1 and ε2-simple if Remp(h, Zg) ≤ ε2. The content and performance of g and h
constitute a body of evidence E, which Alice uses to update her beliefs about causal
hypotheses C. Relevance is measured by the posterior expected utility of the utility-
maximising action, EC
[
u(a∗, C)|E]. (For consistency with the previous desiderata,
we in fact measure irrelevance by multiplying the relevance by − 1.) Bob’s explanation
is ε3-relevant to Alice if –EC
[
u(a∗, C)|E] ≤ ε3.
We may now locate explanations generated by this game in three-dimensional
space, with axes corresponding to accuracy, simplicity, and relevance. An explanation
is deemed satisfactory if it does not exceed preselected values of ε1, ε2, and ε3. These
parameters can be interpreted as budgetary constraints on Alice and Bob. How much
error, complexity, and irrelevance can they afford? We assign equal weight to all
three criteria here, but relative costs could easily be quantified through a differential
weighting scheme. Together, these points define the extremum of a cuboid, whose
opposite diagonal is the origin (see Fig. 2). Any point falling within this cuboid is
(ε1, ε2, ε3)-satisfactory.
Fig. 2 The space of satisfactory
explanations is delimited by
upper bounds on the error (ε1),
complexity (ε2), and irrelevance




5.3 Consistency and convergence
The formal tools of statistical learning, causal interventionism, and decision theory
provide all the ingredients we need to state the necessary and sufficient conditions
for polynomial time convergence to a conditionally optimal explanation surface.
We define optimality in terms of a Pareto frontier. One explanation Pareto-dominates
another if and only if it is strictly better along at least one axis and no worse along
any other axis. If Alice and Bob are unable to improve upon the accuracy, simplicity,
or relevance of an explanation without incurring some loss along another dimension,
then they have found a Pareto-dominant explanation. A collection of such explanations
constitutes a Pareto frontier, a surface of explanations from which Alice may choose
whichever best aids her understanding and serves her interests. Note that this is a
relatively weak notion of optimality. Explanations may be optimal in this sense without
even being satisfactory, since the entire Pareto frontier may lie beyond the satisfactory
cuboid defined by (ε1, ε2, ε3). In this case, Alice and Bob have two options: (a) accept
that no explanation will satisfy the criteria and adjust thresholds accordingly; or (b)
start a new round with one or several different input parameters. Option (b) will
generate entirely new explanation surfaces for the players to explore.
Without more information about the target function f or specific facts about Alice’s
knowledge and interests, conditional Pareto dominance is the strongest form of opti-
mality we can reasonably expect. Convergence on a Pareto frontier is almost surely
guaranteed on three conditions:
• Condition 1. The function spaces Gb and H are of finite VC dimension.
• Condition 2. Answers to all w-questions are uniquely identifiable.
• Condition 3. Alice is a rational agent and consistent Bayesian updater.
Condition (1) entails the statistical consistency of Bob’s model g and Alice’s model
h, which ensures that accuracy and simplicity are reliably measured as sample size
grows. Condition (2) entails that simulated datasets are faithful to their underlying
data generating processes, thereby ensuring that g and h converge on the right targets.
Condition (3) entails the existence of at least one utility-maximising action a∗ ∈ A with
a well-defined posterior expectation. If her probabilities are well-calibrated, then Alice
will tend to pick the “right” action, or at least an action with no superior alternative in
A. With these conditions in place, each round of the game will result in an explanation
that cannot be improved upon without altering the input parameters.
If all subroutines of the game’s inner loops execute in polynomial time, then the
round will execute in polynomial time as well. The only potentially NP-hard problem
is finding an adequate map ψ , which cannot be efficiently computed without some
restrictions on the solution set. A naïve approach would be to consider all possible
subsets of the original feature space, but even in the Markovian setting this would
result in an unmanageable 2d maps, where d represents the dimensionality of the
input matrix X. Efficient mapping requires some principled method for restricting this
space to just those of potential interest for Alice. The best way to do so for any given




Current iML proposals do not instantiate the explanation game in any literal sense.
However, our framework can be applied to evaluate the merits and shortcomings
of existing methods. It also provides a platform through which to conceptualise the
constraints and requirements of any possible iML proposal, illuminating the contours
of the solution space.
The most popular iML methods in use today are local linear approximators like
LIME (Ribeiro et al. 2016) and SHAP (Lundberg and Lee 2017). The former explains
predictions by randomly sampling around the point of interest. Observations are
weighted by their distance from the target point and a regularised linear model is
fit by weighted least squares. The latter builds on foundational work in cooperative
game theory, using training data to efficiently compute pointwise approximations of
each input feature’s Shapley value.7 The final result in both cases is a (possibly sparse)
set of coefficients indicating the positive or negative association between input features
and the response, at least near xi and conditional on the covariates.
Using LIME or SHAP basically amounts to restricting the function space of Bob’s
explanation model g to the class of regularised linear models. Each method has its
own default kernel k, as well as recommended mapping functions ψ for particular
data types. For instance, LIME coarsens image data into super-pixels, while SHAP
uses saliency maps to visualise the portions of an input image that were most impor-
tant in determining its classification. While the authors of the two methods seem to
suggest that a single run of either algorithm is sufficient for explanatory purposes,
local linear approximations will tend to be unstable for datapoints near especially
nonlinear portions of the decision boundary or regression surface. Thus, multiple runs
with perturbed data may be necessary to establish the precision of estimated feature
weights. This corresponds to multiple rounds of the explanation game, thereby giving
Alice a more complete picture of the model space.
One major problem with LIME and SHAP is that neither method allows users to
specify a contrast class of interest. The default behaviour of both algorithms is to
explain why an outcome is yˆi as opposed to y¯—that is, the mean response for the
entire dataset (real or simulated). In many contexts, this makes sense. For instance,
if Alice receives a rare and unexpected diagnosis, then she may want to know what
differentiates her from the majority of patients. However, it seems strange to suggest,
as these algorithms implicitly do, that “normal” predictions are inexplicable. There is
nothing confusing or improper about Alice wondering, for instance, why she received
an average credit score instead of a better-than-average one. Yet in their current form,
neither LIME nor SHAP can accommodate such inquiries.
More flexible alternatives exist. Rule lists, which predict outcomes through a series
of if–then statements, can model nonlinear effects that LIME and SHAP are incapable
of detecting in principle. Several iML solutions are built on recursive partitioning
7 Shapley values were originally designed to fairly distribute surplus across a coalition of players in coop-
erative games (Shapley 1953). They are the unique solution to the attribution problem that satisfies certain
desirable properties, including local accuracy, missingness, and consistency. Directly computing Shapley
values is NP-hard, however numerous approximations have been proposed. See Sundararajan and Najmi
(2019) for an overview.
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Table 2 Utility matrix for Alice
in the (bad) bank scenario
c1: Wealth c2: Race
a1: Sue − 1 5
a2: Don’t sue 0 0
(Guidotti et al. 2018; Ribeiro et al. 2018; Yang et al. 2017)—the statistical procedure
that produces rule lists—and a growing number of psychological studies suggests that
users find such explanations especially intelligible (Lage et al. 2018). If Alice is one
of the many people who shares this preference for rule lists, then Bob should take this
into account when selecting Gb.
Counterfactual explanations are endorsed by Wachter et al. (2018), who propose
a novel iML solution based on generative adversarial networks (GANs). Building on
pioneering research in deep learning (Goodfellow et al. 2014), the authors demonstrate
how GANs can be used to find the minimal perturbation of input features sufficient
to alter the output in some prespecified manner. These models are less restrictive than
linear regressions or rule lists, as they not only allow users to identify a contrast class
but can in principle adapt to any differentiable function. Wachter et al. emphasise the
importance of simplicity by imposing a sparsity constraint on explanatory outputs
intended to automatically remove uninformative features.
Rule lists and GANs have some clear advantages over linear approximators like
LIME and SHAP. However, no method in use today explicitly accounts for user inter-
ests, an omission that may lead to undesirable outcomes. In short, they do not pass the
eclipsing test. Recall the case of the (bad) bank in Sect. 5.1.3. Suppose that Alice’s
choice set contains just two options, A  {Sue, Don’t sue}, and she considers two
causal hypotheses as potential explanations for her denied loan, C  {Wealth, Race}.
Alice’s utility matrix is given in Table 2.
Alice assigns a uniform prior over C to begin with, such that P(c1)  P(c2)  0.5.
She receives two explanations from Bob: g1, according to which Alice’s application
was denied due to her wealth; and g2, according to which Alice’s application was
denied due to her race. Using misclassification rate as our loss function and assuming
a uniform probability mass over the dichotomous features Wealth ∈ {Rich, Poor} and
















However, they induce decidedly different posteriors over C:
P(c1|g1)  P(c2|g2)  0.9
P(c1|g2)  P(c2|g1)  0.1
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The posterior expected utility of a1 under g1 is therefore
0.9(−1) + 0.1(5)  −0.4,
whereas under g2 the expectation is
0.1(−1) + 0.9(5)  4.4.
(The expected utility of a2 is 0 under both explanations.) Since the utility-maximising
action under g2 is strictly preferable to the utility-maximising action under g1, we
regard g2 as the superior explanation. In fact, the latter Pareto-dominates the former,
since the two are equivalent in terms of accuracy and simplicity but g1 is strictly less
relevant for Alice than g2. This determination can only be made by explicitly encoding
Alice’s preferences, which are currently ignored by all major iML proposals.
Methods that fail to pass the eclipsing test pose problems for all three iML goals
outlined in Sect. 2. Irrelevant explanations can undermine tests of validity or quests
of discovery by failing to recognise the epistemological purpose that motivated the
question in the first place. When those explanations are accurate and simple, Alice can
easily be fooled into thinking she has learned some valuable information. In fact, Bob
has merely overfit the data. Matters are even worse when we seek to audit algorithms.
In this case, eclipsing explanations may actually offer loopholes to bad actors wishing
to avoid controversy over questionable decisions. For instance, a myopic focus on
accuracy and simplicity would allow (bad) banks to get away with racist loan policies
so long as black applicants are found wanting along some other axis of variation.
7 Objections
In this section, we consider five objections of increasing generality. The first three are
levelled against our proposed game, the latter two against the entire iML project.
7.1 Too highly idealised
One obvious objection to our proposal is that it demands a great deal of Alice. She
must provide a contrastive outcome y˜i , a level of abstraction LoA, a choice set A, some
causal hypotheses C, a corresponding prior distribution P(C), and a utility function u.
On top of all that, we also expect her to be a consistent Bayesian updater and expected
utility maximiser. If Alice were so well-equipped and fiercely rational, then perhaps
cracking black box algorithms would pose no great challenge to her.
Our response is twofold. First, we remind the sceptical reader that idealisations are
a popular and fruitful tool in conceptual analysis. There are no frictionless planes or
infinite populations, but such assumptions have contributed to successful theories in
physics and genetics. Potochnik (2017) makes a compelling case that idealisations are
essential to scientific practice, enabling humans to represent and manipulate systems
of incomprehensible complexity. Decision theory is no exception. The assumption that
epistemic agents always make rational choices—though strictly speaking false—has
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advanced our understanding of individual and social behaviour in economics, psy-
chology, and computer science.
Second, this setup is not nearly as unrealistic as it may at first appear. It is perfectly
reasonable to assume that an agent would seek an algorithmic explanation with at
least a counterfactual outcome and choice set to hand, as well as some (tentative)
causal hypotheses. For instance, Alice may enter into the game expressly because she
suspects her loan application was denied due to her race, and is unsure whether to seek
redress. Utilities can be derived through a simple ranking of all action-outcome pairs.
If new hypotheses emerge over the course of the game, they can easily be explored
in subsequent rounds. Alice may have less confidence in ideal values for LoA and
P(C), but there is no reason to demand certainty about these from the start. Indeed,
it is advisable to try out a range of values for each, much like how analysts often
experiment with different priors to ascertain the impact on posteriors in Bayesian
inference (Gelman et al. 2014). Alice and Bob can iteratively refine their inputs as
the rounds pass and track the evolution of the resulting Pareto frontiers to gauge the
uncertainty associated with various parameters. Something like this process is how a
great deal of research is in fact conducted.
Perhaps most importantly, we stress that Alice and Bob are generalised agents that
can and often will be implemented by hybrid systems involving numerous humans and
machines working in concert. There is no reason to artificially restrict the cognitive
resources of either to that of any specific individual. The problems iML is designed
to tackle are beyond the remit of any single person, especially one operating without
the assistance of statistical software. When we broaden the cognitive scope of Alice
and Bob, the idealisations demanded of them become decidedly more plausible. The
only relevant upper bounds on their inferential capacities are computational complex-
ity thresholds. The explanation game is an exercise in sociotechnical epistemology,
where knowledge emerges from the continuous interaction of individuals, groups, and
technology (Watson and Floridi 2018). The essential point is whether the explanation
game we have designed is possible and fruitful, not whether a specific Alice and a
specific Bob can actually play it according to their idiosyncratic abilities.
7.2 Infinite regress
A common challenge to any account of explanation is the threat of infinite regress.
Assuming that explanations must be finite, how can we be sure that some explanatory
method concludes at the proper terminus? In this instance, how can we guarantee that
the explanation game does not degenerate into an infinite recursive loop? Note that this
is not a concern for any fixed Alice and Bob—each round ends once models g and h
are scored, and Alice’s expected utilities are updated—but the objection appears more
menacing over shifting agents and games. For instance, we may worry that Alice and







through the intermediate model g. The resulting function may now
be queried by a new agent Alice2 who seeks the assistance of Bob2 in accounting for
some prediction f2(xi ). This process could repeat indefinitely.
123
Synthese
The error in this reasoning is to ignore the vital role of pragmatics. By construction,
each game ends at the proper terminus for that particular Alice. There is nothing
fallacious about allowing other agents to inquire into the products of such games as if
they were new algorithms. The result will simply be t steps removed from its original
source, where t is the number of Alice-and-Bob teams separating the initial f from
the latest inquirer. The effect is not so unlike a game of telephone, where a message
gradually degrades as players introduce new errors at each iteration. Similarly, each
new Alice-and-Bob pair will do their best to approximate the work of the previous
team. The end result may look quite unlike the original f for some large value of t,
but that is only to be expected. So long as conditions (1)–(3) are met for any given
Alice and Bob, then they are almost surely guaranteed to converge on a conditionally
optimal explanation surface in polynomial time.
7.3 Pragmatism + pluralism relativist anarchy?
The explanation game relies heavily on pragmatic considerations. We explicitly advo-
cate for subjective notions of simplicity and relevance, allowing Bob to construct
numerous explanations at various levels of abstraction. This combination of subjec-
tivism and pluralism grates against the realist tradition in epistemology and philosophy
of science, according to which there is exactly one true explanans for any given
explanandum. Is there not a danger here of slipping into some disreputable brand
of outright relativism? If criteria for explanatory success are so irreducibly subjective,
is there simply no fact of the matter as to which of two competing explanations is
superior? Is this not tantamount to saying that anything goes?
The short answer is no. The objection assumes that for any given fact or event
there exists some uniquely satisfactory, mind- and context-independent explanation,
presumably in terms of fundamental physical units and laws. Call this view explana-
tory monism. It amounts to a metaphysical doctrine whose merits or shortcomings
are frankly beside the point. For even if the “true” explanation were always available,
it would not in general be of much use. The goal of the explanation game is to pro-
mote greater understanding for Alice. This may come in many forms. For instance,
the predictions of image classifiers are often explained by heatmaps highlighting the
pixels that most contribute to the given output. The fact that complex mathematical
formulae could in this case provide a maximally deep and stable explanation is irrel-
evant (see Sect. 5.1.1). Pragmatic goals require pragmatic strategies. Because iML is
fundamentally about getting humans to understand the behaviour of machines, there
is a growing call for personalised solutions (Páez 2019). We take this pragmatic turn
seriously and propose formal methods to implement it.
We emphatically reject the charge that the explanation game is so permissive that
“anything goes”. Far from it, we define objective measures of subjective notions that
have long defied crisp formalisation. Once values for all variables are specified, it
is a straightforward matter to score and compare competing explanations. For any
set of input parameters, there exists a unique ordering of explanations in terms of
their relative accuracy, simplicity, and relevance. Explanations at different levels of
abstraction may be incommensurable, but together they can help Alice form a more
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complete picture of the target system and its behaviour near the datapoint of interest.
This combination of pragmatism and explanatory ecumenism is flexible and rational. It
embraces relationalism, not relativism (Floridi 2017). One of the chief contributions of
this paper is to demonstrate that the desiderata of iML can be formulated with precision
and rigour without sacrificing the subjective and contextual aspects that make each
explanation game unique.
7.4 No trade-off
Some have challenged the widespread assumption that there is an inherent trade-off
between accuracy and interpretability in ML. Rudin (2019) argues forcefully against
this view, which she suggests is grounded in anecdotal evidence at best, and corpo-
rate secrecy at worst. She notes that science has long shown a preference for more
parsimonious models, not out of mere aesthetic whimsy, but because of well-founded
principles regarding the inherent simplicity of nature (Baker 2016). Recent results
in formal learning theory confirm that an Ockham’s Razor approach to hypothesis
testing is the optimal strategy for convergence to the truth under minimal topological
constraints (Kelly et al. 2016).
Breiman (2001) famously introduced the idea of a Rashomon set8—a collection
of models that estimate the same functional relationship using different algorithms
and/or hyperparameters, yet all perform reasonably well (say, within 5% of the top
performing model). Rudin’s argument—expanded in considerable technical detail in
a follow up paper (Semenova and Rudin 2019)—is premised on the assumption that
sufficiently large Rashomon sets should include at least one interpretable model. If
so, then it would seem there is no point in explaining black box algorithms, at least in
high-stakes applications such as healthcare and criminal justice. If we must use ML
for these purposes, then we should simply train a (globally) interpretable model in the
first place, rather than reverse-engineer imperfect post hoc explanations.
There are two problems with this objection. First, there is no logical or statistical
guarantee that interpretable models will outperform black box competitors or even be
in the Rashomon set of high-performing models for any given predictive problem. This
is a simple corollary of the celebrated no free lunch theorem (Wolpert and Macready
1997), which states (roughly) that there is no one-size-fits-all solution in ML. Any
algorithm that performs well on one class of problems will necessarily perform poorly
on another. Of course, this cuts both ways—black box algorithms are likewise guar-
anteed to fail on some datasets. If we value performance above all, which may well
be the case for some especially important tasks, then we must be open to models of
variable interpretability.
Second, the opacity of black box algorithms is not just a by-product of complex
statistical techniques, but of institutional realities that are unlikely to change anytime
soon. Pasquale (2015) offers a number of memorable case studies demonstrating how
IP law is widely used to protect ML source code and training data not just from
potential competitors but from any form of external scrutiny. Even if a firm were using
8 The name comes from Akira Kurosawa’s celebrated 1950 film Rashomon, in which four characters give
overlapping but inconsistent eyewitness accounts of a brutal crime in eighth century Kyoto.
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an interpretable model to make its predictions, the model architecture and parameters
would likely be subject to strict copyright protections. Some have argued for the
creation of independent third-party groups tasked with the responsibility of auditing
code under non-disclosure agreements (Floridi et al. 2018; Wachter et al. 2017), a
proposal we personally support. However, until such legislation is enacted, anyone
attempting to monitor the fairness, accountability, and transparency of algorithms will
almost certainly have no choice but to treat the underlying technology as a black box.
7.5 Double standards
Zerilli et al. (2019) argue that proponents of iML place an unreasonable burden on
algorithms by demanding that they not only perform better and faster than humans, but
explain why they do so as well. They point out that human decision-making is far from
transparent, and that people are notoriously bad at justifying their actions. Why the
double standard? We already have systems in place for accrediting human decision-
makers in positions of authority (e.g., judges and doctors) based on their demonstrated
track record of performance. Why should we expect anything more from machines?
The authors conclude that requiring intelligibility of high-performing algorithms is not
just unreasonable but potentially harmful if it hinders the implementation of models
that could improve services for end users.
Zerilli et al. are right to point out that we are often unreliable narrators of our
own internal reasoning. We are liable to rationalise irrational impulses, draw false
inferences, and make decisions based on a host of well-documented heuristics and
cognitive biases. But this is precisely what makes iML so promising: not that learning
algorithms are somehow immune to human biases—they are not, at least not if those
biases are manifested in the training data—but rather that, with the right tools, we
may conclusively reveal the true reasoning behind consequential decisions. Kleinberg
et al. (2019) make a strong case that increased automation will reduce discrimination
by inaugurating rigorous, objective procedures for auditing and appealing algorithmic
predictions. It is exceedingly difficult under current law to prove that a human has
engaged in discriminatory behaviour, especially if they insist that they have not (which
most people typically do, especially when threatened with legal sanction). For all the
potential harms posed by algorithms, deliberate deception is not (yet) one of them.
We argue that the potential benefits of successful iML strategies are more var-
ied and numerous than Kleinberg et al. acknowledge. To reiterate the motivations
listed in Sect. 2, we see three areas of particular promise. In the case of algorith-
mic auditing, iML can help ensure the fair, accountable, and transparent application
of complex statistical models in high-stakes applications like criminal justice and
healthcare. In the case of validation, iML can be used to test algorithms before and
during deployment to ensure that models are performing properly and not overfitting
to uninformative patterns in the training data. In the case of discovery, iML can reveal
heretofore unknown mechanisms in complex target systems, suggesting new theories
and hypotheses for testing. Of course, there is no guarantee that such methods will
work in every instance—iML is no panacea—but it would be foolish not to try. The




Black box algorithms are here to stay. Private and public institutions already rely
on ML to perform basic and complex functions with greater efficiency and accuracy
than people. Growing datasets and ever-improving hardware, in combination with
ongoing advances in computer science and statistics, ensure that these methods will
only become more ubiquitous in the years to come.
There is less reason to believe that algorithms will become any more transpar-
ent or intelligible, at least not without the explicit and sustained effort of dedicated
researchers in the burgeoning field of iML. We have argued that there are good reasons
to value algorithmic interpretability on ethical, epistemological, and scientific grounds.
We have outlined a formal framework in which agents can collaborate to explain the
outputs of any supervised learner. The explanation game serves both a descriptive
function—providing a common language in which to compare iML proposals—and
a normative function—highlighting aspects that are underexplored in the current lit-
erature and pointing the way to new and improved solutions. Of course, important
normative challenges remain. Thorny questions of algorithmic fairness, accountabil-
ity, and transparency are not all so swiftly resolved. However, we are hopeful that the
explanation game can inform these debates in a productive and principled manner.
Future work will relax the assumptions upon which this beta version of the game is
based. Of special interest are adversarial alternatives in which Bob has his own utility
function to maximise, or three-player versions in which Carol and Bob compete to
find superior explanations from which Alice must choose. Other promising directions
include implementing semi-automated explanation games with greedy algorithms that
take turns maximising one explanatory desideratum at a time until convergence. Sim-
ilar proposals have already been implemented for optimising mixed objectives in
algorithmic fairness (Kearns et al. 2018), but we are unaware of any similar work
in explainability. Finally, we intend to expand our scope to unsupervised learning
algorithms, which pose a number of altogether different explanatory challenges.
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